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Abstract
Matters related to the protection of traditional cultural expressions (‘TCEs’) or 
expressions of folklore (‘EoFs’) are sensitive and intricate as a blend of legal, eco-
nomic, philosophical and anthropological considerations jostle to capture their core 
features. This results in disparate views surrounding what should qualify as TCEs 
or EoFs, who should be considered their ‘owner’ (assuming that ownership per se 
is conceptually compatible with these items), which is the most appropriate legal 
protection regime and how broad their scope of protection should be. Drawing from 
these various accounts on TCEs, this article focuses on the interaction between 
TCEs and EoFs originating on the European continent and the European Union 
(‘EU’) trade mark legislation. Specifically, this article examines whether the limita-
tions of the effects of trade mark rights and of the absolute grounds of refusal, as 
developed by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, are effec-
tive in preserving the cohesion of TCEs. This article advances the thesis that regis-
tration of TCEs and EoFs as trade marks generates an imbalance between the rights 
of the trade mark owner and the defences available to others under the EU trade 
mark law framework. Furthermore, such an imbalance is likely to hinder the unfet-
tered circulation of TCEs and undermine their original meaning. Lastly, in some 
cases, trade mark registration of TCEs contributes to their appropriation and misap-
propriation. The article concludes that, de lege ferenda, the direct exclusion of TCEs 
as eligible subject matter for trade mark registration is preferable to seeking a post 
factum remedy.
Keywords Traditional cultural expressions · Free riding · Dilution · Cultural 
appropriation · Trade marks
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‘We seem as a species to be driven by a desire to make meanings: above all, 
we are surely homo-significans – meaning-makers’ [22, p. 13].
One month before the 2014 presidential elections in Romania [8], both social media 
and the conventional press were saturated with election related messages, slogans 
and advertisements. One of the then candidates used traditional Romanian deco-
rative folkloric patterns on his electoral posters accompanied by slogans such as 
‘Proud to be Romanians’. Besides the ignored legal prohibition on use of the col-
ours of the Romanian flag on campaign materials—which was clearly breached—I 
felt instinctively that there was something else ‘wrong’ with the way this campaign 
was carried out. The use of traditional Romanian patterns disturbed me in a manner 
which is difficult to explain, giving rise to a sense or ‘feeling of lost authenticity’ 
[23, p. 4] in my mind. This visual encounter and the way such signs are used to con-
vey messages to the public made me think about trade marks. Should certain TCEs 
should be considered ‘off limits’ in terms of registration under the EU trade mark 
law? This is how the research question of this article surfaced.
I attempt to respond to this question first by examining, in section two, the various 
definitions given to TCEs, their main features and the justifications underpinning the 
need to preserve their original meaning. I also consider the nexus between the Euro-
pean EoFs, cultural heritage and the commitment of the EU and that of the Council 
of Europe to safeguarding TCEs. Next, in section three, I demonstrate that while 
the EU should ensure the cohesion of TCEs, in practice EU trade mark legislation 
grants trade mark owners rights which permit them to significantly alter the original 
meaning of TCEs. I argue that a systemic interpretation of the absolute grounds of 
refusal contained in trade mark law and of the legislation committed to safeguard-
ing the European cultural heritage could be employed successfully to preserve the 
original meaning of TCEs. In section four, I examine the effects of trade mark reg-
istration on TCEs pertaining to Greek mythology and Romanian folklore. This sec-
tion illustrates that TCEs may be blurred, tarnished or taken unfair advantage of 
in the same way as reputed trade marks. In the concluding section, I demonstrate 
how, inter alia, EU trade mark law1 may, via trade mark registration, permit TCEs to 
be appropriated and misappropriated. Because there are several angles from which 
appropriation can be viewed, there is some ambiguity surrounding the concepts of 
cultural appropriation and misappropriation. For the purposes of this article, I shall 
use the term ‘appropriation’ in a narrow and specific sense, namely the exclusive 
commercial exploitation of a TCE as a trade mark by an entity unconnected with the 
1 The legal analysis herein contains references to the provisions of the First Council Directive 89/104/
EEC, Directive 2008/95/EC (‘TMD 2008’) and the Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (‘CTMR 
2009’) which have now been repealed and replaced by subsequent legislative acts, namely Directive 
(EU) 2015/2436 (‘TMD 2015’) and Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 (‘EUTMR’). The TMD 2015 and the 
EUTMR have maintained the structure of the initial provisions analysed in this article. Therefore, the 
analysis covers the legal status quo of Member States’ national trade marks and European Union trade 
marks.
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originating community with the result that the TCE becomes deprived of its original 
meaning [24, p. 197]. Similarly, I use the term ‘misappropriation’ as a type of trade 
mark use, encompassing TCEs either in their original form or in an adapted one, 
which ‘falsely suggests a connection with the community concerned or brings the 
community into contempt or disrepute’ [52, p. 57].
A major caveat of this article is that it only discusses those folkloric symbols, 
names of folkloric legends, characters and/or mythological figures etc. which are 
registerable as trade marks by virtue of their nature (this excludes, for example, 
those which cannot be represented graphically or in another suitable form on the 
public trade mark register). Additionally, the article does not address the debate sur-
rounding whether it is appropriate to use the intellectual property rights (‘IPRs’) 
system as a legal regime apt to preserve and protect TCEs.
For ease of reference, the terms ‘EoF’ and ‘TCE’ shall be used interchangeably 
in this article although their meaning is not always the same. Furthermore, the term 
‘protection’ shall be used in order to designate those actions aiming at prohibiting 
‘some form of unauthorized use of material by third parties’ [54, p. 3]. The term 
‘safeguard’ will be used on the other hand in order to refer to measures taken for the 
‘the survival of the TCE for future generations’ [54, p. 3]. The difference between 
these two concepts is sometimes emphasized and considered important when 
addressing the situation of TCEs in the context of defining the scope of the legal 
instruments dealing with TCEs [54, p. 3]. Certain conclusions drawn regarding the 
potential negative effects of trade mark registration of TCEs are not based upon use 
of qualitative research methods, such as interviews with members of the communi-
ties where specific TCEs referred to in this article originated. Instead, I have tried 
to formulate an argumentation based upon the available literature, submissions of 
indigenous communities and fact-finding mission reports addressing similar issues. 
Lastly, the choice of the symbols presented in the section dedicated to case studies 
and the conclusions presented therein are not intended to speak on behalf of the 
communities, which regularly acknowledge those TCEs as pertaining to them. Like-
wise, these conclusions should not be regarded as a form of activism that fights the 
trade mark registration system against a more or less elusive ‘capitalist harm’. The 
purpose of these examples is to demonstrate that under current EU trade mark law, 
it is possible for symbols having a folkloric significance to be registered by entities 
unrelated to this background, and to pinpoint the effects which such registration may 
have on the symbol’s original meaning.
2  Traditional Cultural Expressions: Meaning, Ambit 
and Controversies
2.1  An Attempt to Establish Some Generally Accepted Traits of TCEs
One of the most salient predicaments, when examining TCEs, is to produce a defini-
tion able to encompass their complexity and ever-evolving nature [46, 64, 84, p. 3]. 
As further discussed below, various bodies have dedicated significant resources to 
drafting comprehensive definitions which might determine the boundaries of TCEs 
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as objects of legal protection. The primary scope of this subsection is not to deter-
mine which of these various definitions is the most appropriate (even if I do ana-
lyse some of their deficiencies). Instead, I shall examine these definitions in order to 
establish the essential features of TCEs which are common to the ideologies of all 
these bodies and certain indigenous groups involved in this debate.
The 1985 Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions 
of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and other Prejudicial Actions (‘Model Pro-
visions’) adopted jointly by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (‘WIPO’) 
and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (‘UNE-
SCO’) define EoFs, in Sect. 2, as:
‘productions consisting of characteristic elements of the traditional artistic 
heritage developed and maintained by a community of [name of the country] 
or by individuals reflecting the traditional artistic expectations of such a com-
munity’.
UNESCO’s 1989 Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and 
Folklore (‘Recommendation’) regards folklore as a body of traditional creations 
pertaining to a ‘cultural community’ which ‘reflect its cultural and social identity’. 
According to the Recommendation, folklore may be expressed through mythol-
ogy amongst other forms. WIPO, through its Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore 
(‘IPGRTKF Committee’), has perhaps made the most visible developments in this 
area. In 2017, it released a document entitled ‘The Protection of Traditional Cultural 
Expressions: Draft Articles’ which, in Article 2, proposes two definitions for TCEs.
The first proposal is a rather lengthy definition which enumerates the basic fea-
tures of TCEs: ‘any form of [artistic and literary], [other creative, and spiritual,] 
[creative and literary or artistic] expression’, ‘tangible or intangible’, ‘expressed 
or illustrated’ [79]. From the outset, this definition seems to allow a relatively 
large number of expressions to qualify for legal protection. However, the subse-
quent conditions contained in this article curtail the purview of legally protectable 
TCEs. Thus, in order to qualify as a TCE, the sign, symbol or expression must be 
‘expressed and maintained, in a collective context, by indigenous [peoples] and local 
communities’, it has to represent ‘the unique product of and/or directly linked with 
and the cultural [and]/[or] social identity and cultural heritage of indigenous [peo-
ples] and local communities’ and it must be ‘transmitted from generation to genera-
tion, whether consecutively or not’ [79]. This account of TCEs is open to objection 
because it utilizes concepts, such as ‘social identity’ or ‘collective context’, which 
not only do not have predetermined meanings, but which are also open to quite wide 
and variable interpretations. For example, one could question whether the last two 
remaining persons of an indigenous community who preserve TCEs would qualify 
as a ‘collective’. The alternative definition proposed by Article 2 appears to be more 
relaxed in terms of legal requirements which need to be fulfilled by the TCE in ques-
tion, indicating that TCEs:
‘comprise the various dynamic forms which are created, expressed, or mani-
fested in traditional cultures and are integral to the collective cultural and 
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social identities of the indigenous local communities and other beneficiaries’ 
[79].
Even though the term TCE is often used by WIPO interchangeably with the term 
EoF, it is interesting to note that, as opposed to the Recommendation, none of these 
alternative definitions uses the term ‘folklore’ in order portray TCEs. One possible 
explanation for this omission is that ‘the use of the word “folklore”’ [47, p. 756] was 
challenged on the basis that developing countries considered it an archaism which 
imparted a negative overtone on TCEs as ‘creations of lower or superseded civili-
zations’. For the sake of clarity, it is emphasised that the use of term ‘folklore’ in 
this article is in no way made pejoratively. The negative connotation which indig-
enous communities give to the term ‘folklore’ is closely connected to the critique 
that Western countries and their institutions use to curtail the boundaries of TCEs to 
tradition [64, p. 6]. By contrast, developing countries and native populations are said 
to have an extensive apprehension of these concepts [64, p. 6]. Specifically, those 
representing native cultures argue that TCEs should not be regarded as a different 
item than traditional knowledge [46, p. 99].
Hence, it may be argued that the way WIPO or UNESCO try to define TCEs is 
similar to a process of ‘cultural learning’ [23, p. 90]. Such a mechanism is objec-
tionable because it impairs the communication of cross-cultural information from 
the source to its receiver owing to a series of political factors [23, p. 90], or even 
in some cases, because of the existence of conflicts of interest. For example, WIPO 
through its abovementioned IPGRTKF Committee, is the institution which advo-
cates the protection of TCEs and defines their content and yet, at the same time, 
WIPO also oversees the registration of trade marks, including some which consist of 
TCEs. Furthermore, the attempt to introduce a duration for which ‘the TCE would 
need to have been used for in order to be protectable’ [80] is questionable, not least 
because it gives rise to issues such as the way the temporal criteria should be proved.
On the other hand, the alternative of increasing the influence that indigenous 
communities have over what should qualify as a TCE is preferable. This alternative 
is justified on the basis of their right to self-identification as a component of their 
right to self-determination recognized by Article 1 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [1]. In this context, the right to self-iden-
tification cannot be exercised more efficiently than by offering these communities 
the possibility of defining the scope and subject matter of legal protection. Further 
justification is founded in the fact that it is these communities who experience the 
feelings and emotions attached to their continuing use of the TCEs, as shown in 
WIPO’s Report on Fact-Finding Missions on Intellectual Property and Traditional 
Knowledge between 1998 and 1999 [78, p. 137]. In the same vein, the representative 
of the Tulalip Tribes, originating from Washington, identifies that these ‘expressions 
are not simply expressions, but bound to governance, identity, dignity and integrity 
and woven into rituals, practices, spiritual beliefs, stories, practices, and ceremonies’ 
[48, p. 6].
These feelings, although playing a pivotal role in the spiritual and cultural attach-
ment of indigenous communities to TCEs, were ‘lost in translation’ when those 
outside these communities, including members of legal committees, attempted to 
 L. Olteanu 
1 3
describe them. And despite WIPO’s efforts, through fact finding missions et al., to 
‘identify, as far as possible, the IP needs and expectations of TK holders’ [78, p. 5], 
understanding such feelings and ‘transcribing’ them into legal documents proved a 
rather futile exercise.
In this regard, indigenous communities rightly opposed some of the restrictions 
imposed by WIPO as to what should count as ‘protectable’ TCEs. Members of the 
Tulalip Tribes stressed that placing ‘limits as a condition of eligibility for protection 
of TCEs reflected a profound misunderstanding of the nature of TCEs and how they 
are created’ [54, p. 8]. Moreover, since TCEs have a ‘slowly evolving’ nature, the 
process of determining ‘when a particular variant of a TCE work was first created 
for the purpose of measuring time under the proposed eligibility criteria is very dif-
ficult’ [54, p. 8]. Such dangerous misconceptions can be avoided through an effec-
tive collaboration with members of the respective communities, a collaboration that 
could be framed in a similar fashion to ethnographic research.
Clifford argues that the negative effects of political factors which interfere with 
‘cultural learning’ in ethnographic research could be overcome by engaging with 
members of indigenous communities at a deeper level. Clifford refers to the work 
of well-known ethnographer, Geneviève Calame-Griaule in order to illustrate how a 
meaningful collaboration can generate a rather accurate account of such communi-
ties’ understanding of their culture. Calame-Griaule documented the life and culture 
of the Dogon people of Mali and her research method involved the interaction with 
‘four key collaborators, giving hints of their personal styles and concerns’ [23, p. 
91]. This led to ‘an authentic creation of “Dogon thought’s need in expressing itself 
for dialectic, for an exchange of questions and answers that interpenetrate and weave 
themselves together (p. 17)”’ [23, p. 91].
While issues arising from deciding which is the best way to ‘legally’ defining 
such protean concepts are yet to be resolved, it seems to be accepted by all stake-
holders that TCEs carry a collective meaning allowing communities living in a cer-
tain territory to differentiate themselves from other communities. Despite the sig-
nificance of WIPO’s efforts in this respect, it is worth noting that the fact-finding 
missions aiming at determining the ‘needs and expectations of traditional knowl-
edge holders’ [78] did not consider any European country. This approach is clearly 
flawed because it overlooks the obvious fact that indigenous communities exist in 
Europe too (e.g. the Basques, Catalans, Sámi) [64, p. 10] yet their relevance appears 
to have simply been ignored, which is something that undermines their legitimacy 
in this context in the eyes of the world’s policy bodies. Nevertheless, as it will be 
demonstrated in the next sections, TCEs pertaining to the EU territory are valuable 
sources of inspiration for trade mark owners and they are subject to appropriation 
and misappropriation too.
Though less visible, the EU appears to have been concerned with the ‘legal’ faith 
of EoFs as evidenced by the 2000 Report on the International Protection of Expres-
sions of Culture under Intellectual Property Law (‘Report on Folklore’) instructed 
by the European Commission. Although the Report on Folklore discusses the nar-
rative of folklore as envisaged by the Recommendation and the Model Provisions, 
it does not favour a one-size-fits-all definition. Instead, it advocates an alternative: 
establishing distinct definitions [64, p. 10] depending on the scope of the definition 
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[64, p. 10]. The Report on Folklore identifies four facets [64, p. 10] which purport 
to define the concept of folklore thus accommodating both the Western view and 
the perspective of indigenous communities. The analysis shows that folklore and its 
expressions are temporal, spatial, proprietorial and societal manifestations [64, p. 
10], which vary depending upon the particular location of origin. The temporal facet 
recognises the fact that many TCEs are transmitted from ‘generation to generation’. 
Additionally, even if such transmission does not occur, there appears to be a com-
mon understanding between WIPO, UNESCO and indigenous groups in the sense 
that TCEs represent a resource inherited from the past.
The societal factor encapsulates, inter alia, the aspect that TCEs are used as a 
form of self-identification among members of the same community, or between dif-
ferent communities, which is of quintessential importance to indigenous communi-
ties [4, p. 390]. The proprietorial element (i.e. the fact that TCEs belong and may 
be used by the communities which purportedly generate them) is also recognized 
by indigenous communities. However, it is regarded more as a ‘complex systems of 
regulating the use’ [76] of TCEs, rather than like an exclusive rights system typi-
cally encountered in Western legal systems.
The proprietorial element is often criticized because it is considered that ‘tradi-
tional stories, styles, designs, patterns’ [82, p. 22] may not be the object of property, 
or if they are the kind of things that may be owned, challenges often arise in terms 
of who is the rightful owner [35, p. 20]. As Correa points out, the answers to these 
questions are of particular relevance in discussions concerning protection of TCEs 
(in the sense of ‘asserting positive rights’ over them) [53]. This article, however, 
does not seek to address the issues surrounding which positive protection regime is 
best suited for TCEs. Rather, its approach may be regarded as ‘defensive’ [53] in the 
sense that it seeks to analyse how EU trade mark law could (and arguably should) 
be interpreted to prevent the registration of TCEs as trade marks, and thus, avoid 
their appropriation and misappropriation. Hence, when I analyse the interaction 
between EU trade mark law and TCEs in the subsequent sections, I mainly consider 
the temporal, spatial and societal features of TCEs. Thus, the proprietorial aspect of 
TCEs will be limited to linking TCEs back to their originating community. Before 
delving in this analysis however, it is important to briefly explore various normative 
accounts underpinning the idea that the preservation of TCEs is desirable and/or 
justified in the first place.
2.2  Reflections on the Need to Preserve Culture and Its Iterations
Although this section is dedicated to investigating the reasons why TCEs should not 
be registered as trade marks, I begin my analysis by looking at some of the reasons 
why there is an appetite for using TCEs in trade-related activities. This will help us 
contextualize the discussion regarding the four facets of TCEs as per the previous 
section. It has been suggested that because economics is the driving force behind the 
idea that culture and thus its expressions are important [3, p. 135], concerns relat-
ing to the need to safeguard and protect TCEs only appeared after their economic 
value was discovered [49, p. 883]. From this perspective, it was the emergence of 
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neo-liberalist practices of commodification which triggered the transformation of 
TCEs in cultural capital [35, p. 32]. Arguably, one of the main reasons why there is 
an appetite for registering TCEs as trade marks is that trade marks function as com-
munication tools [73, 81, p. 550] for consumers. Thus, if a TCE already enjoys a 
certain level of public recognition/awareness, registration as a trade mark may save 
the trade mark owner from having to invest additional time and resources in making 
the trade mark known to the public.
Moreover, a TCE’s ‘cultural associations’ [31, p. 1023] makes it an attractive sign 
which explains why some trade marks owners desire to use and register TCEs [31, p. 
1023]. In this sense, using trade marks consisting of TCEs may also exploit consum-
ers’ assumptions that each particular purchase is serving to define their own identity 
[55, p. 340]. From this perspective, trade marks consisting of TCEs are similar to 
trade marks for luxury products which ‘focus on conveying information about the 
buyer’ [15, p. 78] rather than information on the goods and services on which the 
trade mark in question is attached.
Nevertheless, large scale commercial exploitation of TCEs may cause disruption 
between the place of origin of that TCE and the products embodying the TCE if such 
products are manufactured somewhere other than in the territory of origin of the 
TCE [35, p. 32]. Trade mark registration facilitates such disruption because the reg-
istered TCEs then ‘come under the control of others’ [19, p. 4]. A trade mark owner 
is under no obligation to produce the goods and services in the territory of origin of 
the TCE, so ‘native people are no longer masters of their own traditions and identi-
ties’ [19, p. 4] with the risk that ‘outsiders will get a false picture of insiders’ cul-
ture’ [82, p. 25]. Additionally, not only is control over the use of TCEs potentially 
lost along the way, but also a trade mark owner’s ‘replication [of ceremony, music 
and graphic arts] threatens to strip cultural elements of their history and undermine 
their authenticity’ [19, p. 6]. It follows that while economic reasons may justify the 
demand for positive protection of TCEs, the consequences of transforming TCEs in 
cultural capital pose the risk of altering their conceptual value.
From an aesthetics perspective, the attempt to preserve culture irrespective of its 
iterations is questionable because ‘principles of equal dignity militate against allow-
ing one group of people to impose a form of life on the next generation’ [3, p. 136]. 
According to Appiah, it would not, therefore, be fair to preserve TCEs for future gen-
erations as this would automatically dictate the way these generations must behave. 
Although there may be communities where the preservation of TCEs may lead to 
the imposition of more, or less, controversial lifestyles, this contention is not valid 
for all TCEs. Furthermore, protecting the original content of TCEs against practices 
that might alter their meaning does not automatically impose certain behaviours on 
the members of that community. Thus, the argument on which Appiah’s critique is 
based is not applicable to the angle from which this article is written or to the mes-
sage that it wishes to convey.
From a human rights perspective, it is argued that TCEs should be left outside the 
scope of any practice (such as trade mark registration) which may restrict the way in 
which they circulate or are used because any restriction may impinge upon freedom 
of expression [73, p. 356]. Underpinning this contention is the idea that the self-
identification feature of TCEs represents a manifestation of ‘expressive diversity’ 
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[70, p. 185]. Thus, TCEs sometimes function as signs of high cultural value which 
are part of the continuous social dialogue enabling citizens to take part in an ‘ideal 
of participative democracy’ [25, p. 367]. Consequently, the content and connota-
tions of TCEs may only be developed and disseminated in a free environment, with-
out the fear that exclusive rights enforcement could be pursued against those who 
use TCEs [73, p. 356].
Lastly, compelling ethical arguments underpin the need to safeguard TCEs 
against misappropriation which may occur when TCEs are registered as trade marks, 
as will be demonstrated in section three below. First, trade mark use of a TCE may 
generate ‘racist stereotypes’ [24, p. 187]. An example of this is the case of certain 
US trade mark registrations owned by the Washington Redskins (an National Foot-
ball League team) which perpetuated a stereotypical account of Native Americans as 
‘bloodthirsty, warlike savages’ [24, p. 187]. These registrations, incorporating TCEs 
pertaining to the history of Native Americans, were used by their owner to achieve 
specific commercial goals via extensive sales of team merchandise for example. 
Such use does seem unacceptable from an ethical perspective [13, p. 75] given that 
it undermines the dignity of the communities to which these symbols belong to [13, 
p. 75]. Secondly, the notion of fairness which underlies the principle that one should 
not ‘reap where they have not sown’ (used as an ethical ground for the justification 
of the trade mark law system [14, p. 818]) supports the stance that TCEs should not 
be exploited by unrelated third parties through trade mark registration. In essence, a 
trade mark applicant who has not invested any of their own resources in enhancing 
the marketability of a TCE should not be permitted to ‘reap’ any of the benefits of 
trade mark registration arising from the popularity of the sign.
It follows that appropriation practices that also have the potential to alter the orig-
inal meaning of TCEs, such as their registration as trade marks, are not justifiable 
based upon aesthetics, human rights and ethical arguments. With this in mind, in the 
next subsection, I examine the way issues related to the preservation of TCEs have 
been tackled through various legal instruments at the European level.
2.3  A European Commitment to Safeguarding TCEs
This subsection is devoted to a brief overview of the non-trade mark law provisions 
which aim to safeguard TCEs, albeit indirectly. The analysis in this section is not 
confined to EU legislation. It also refers to the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights (‘ECtHr’) and treaties signed under the auspices of the Council 
of Europe. Before discussing the European framework for safeguarding TCEs, it is 
necessary to discuss the connection between EoFs and the concept of ‘cultural herit-
age’. This is needed not only because these two notions are somewhat entangled but 
also because EU and Council of Europe legislation both contain specific provisions 
which aim to preserve European cultural heritage rather than making any express 
reference to folklore or TCEs.
Pursuant to Article 167(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (‘TFEU’), the EU undertakes an obligation to safeguard the ‘cultural herit-
age of European significance’. A Council of the European Union document which 
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identifies European cultural heritage as a source of sustainable development, defines 
‘cultural heritage’ as a pool of ‘resources inherited from the past’ [28] deriving 
‘from the interaction between people and places through time’ [28], ‘constantly 
evolving’ and valuable from a social, environmental and cultural perspective, among 
others. Thus, the Council of the European Union has adopted a rather utilitarian 
approach on the matter which focuses on safeguarding cultural heritage because this 
triggers social and economic benefits. The three characteristics of TCEs relating 
to time, space and social context discussed in the previous section are common to 
this definition’s conception of ‘cultural heritage’. We may conclude then, that Euro-
pean EoFs are part of Europe’s cultural heritage [64, p. 9] and thus, are implicitly 
addressed under the TFEU.
The Council of the European Union adopted its definition for cultural heritage to 
be consistent with that contained in Article 2 of the 2005 Framework Convention 
on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society CETS no 199 (‘The Faro Conven-
tion’) which is still open for ratification for the EU [27]. One of the Convention’s 
highlights is its bold and unconventional definition of ‘cultural heritage’ which is 
considered to have a ‘people-centred approach, and focuses on the people who con-
struct, use and celebrate (or oppose) heritage’ [39, p. 11]. This narrative of cultural 
heritage acknowledges that cultural objects are ‘important because of the meanings 
and uses that people attach to them’ [18, p. 115]. This is particularly aligned to the 
way in which some sociologists explain how brands are built with the help of ‘the 
immaterial labour of consumers’ [5, p. 235], thus emphasizing even more the shared 
features of TCEs and trade marked ‘brands’. The Faro Convention contains certain 
provisions which may be of interest when analysing TCEs in light of EU trade mark 
law. Under Article 5 of the Faro Convention, the contracting states are invited to 
recognise ‘the public interest associated with elements of the cultural heritage in 
accordance with their importance to society’. Additionally, while the economic 
value of cultural heritage is recognised by the Convention in Article 10, the parties 
to the convention are required by Article 3 to:
‘take into account the specific character and interests of the cultural heritage 
when devising economic policies; and ensure that these policies respect the 
integrity of the cultural heritage without compromising its inherent values’ 
[26].
Against this background, it could be argued that were the Faro Convention to be 
adopted by all EU Member States, its provisions would become mandatory and thus 
relevant when assessing the absolute grounds of refusal of trade marks under EU 
trade mark law, specifically in cases related to EU’s public policy. To this end, the 
Faro Convention could be construed as a legal text expressly recognising the value 
of TCEs as part of the public policy of the Members States and thus they could be 
relied upon in order to elicit an extensive interpretation of the grounds of refusal 
relating to public policy as further discussed in section three below. Moreover, Arti-
cle 4(1)(c) of the Faro Convention provides that ‘the exercise of the right to cultural 
heritage may be subject only to those restrictions which are necessary in a demo-
cratic society for the protection of the public interest and the rights and freedoms of 
others’ [26].
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Considering that a trade mark application is a proprietary right because it gives 
rise to a ‘bundle of financial rights and interests’,2 it remains an open question which 
right should be given priority in case of conflicts between the right to cultural herit-
age and the right to private property. As a matter of principle, if the preservation of 
TCEs would be accepted as a matter of public interest, then the right to the exercise 
of cultural heritage would have to prevail.
When regarded as forms of expressive diversity, TCEs may be protected under 
the provisions of Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’). Article 10 provides that ‘the right to free-
dom of expression shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers’. These provisions have been construed as requiring state institutions 
to ensure that the expressive diversity is not affected by the rights of trade marks 
owners [70, p. 215]. While the EU per se has not acceded to the ECHR yet, this is 
expected in accordance with obligations to do so in the Lisbon Treaty (in Article 
6). Nevertheless, all Member States are parties to the ECHR and therefore they are 
bound to observe Article 10 of the ECHR, if not as part of the EU law, then as part 
of their national laws.
It follows that unlike the laborious actions of WIPO or UNESCO, EU legisla-
tion has not sought to tackle the issue of protecting or safeguarding TCEs directly. 
However, TCEs represent an integral part of the cultural heritage of the EU which is 
considered an asset and protectable under the TFEU. Additionally, TCEs represent 
a manifestation of the freedom expression right guaranteed under the ECHR. The 
combined efforts of the EU and of the Council of Europe suggest that there is at 
least a theoretical commitment within Europe to preserve European TCEs. The next 
section investigates the breadth of protection that trade mark owners enjoy under the 
EU law. The purpose of section three is to provide evidence on how the exercise of 
trade mark rights might sometimes undermine a TCE’s original meaning.
3  Trade Mark Monopolies Under the EU Framework?
3.1  Controlling Trade Mark Meaning Under the EU Framework
In this section, I argue that a trade mark owner secures full control over the mean-
ing of their registered trade mark, even though this control is theoretically limited to 
use of that trade mark during the course of trade. I use the term ‘control’ to refer to 
the fact that trade mark owners enjoy the ability of prohibiting all others from using 
a sign similar or identical to their registered trade mark (subject to the fulfilment of 
certain other requirements). By excluding others from using the sign or trade mark 
in question, a trade mark owner receives a legal monopoly over the sign. This is the 
first step in the process of ‘prohibiting allusive use of trade marks’ [33, p. 137] and 
altering the original meaning of TCEs.
2 As per the Court’s interpretation in Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [2007] E.T.M.R. 24, H2.
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Trade mark holders do not have the exclusive right to market certain goods/ser-
vices per se [14, p. 813], rather they may only control the use of a particular range 
of signs (i.e. those identical or confusingly similar to the registered mark) in relation 
to those goods and services in the context of a trading activity. Thus, any use of 
that sign as a component of free speech or, for example, or for other non-commer-
cial activities should not be affected by the exclusivity granted under trade mark 
law. Moreover, a trade mark owner’s exclusive prerogatives are curtailed by several 
defences (non-infringing acts) under the EU framework allowing certain ‘fair uses’ 
of similar or identical signs [32, p. 102]. This might suggest that trade mark own-
ers’ control over the circulation of signs is not that powerful, and that it is unlikely 
that the alteration of the original meaning of a TCE which has been registered and 
used as a trade mark would occur. It might be reasonable to assume that other types 
of uses, for example, use of the TCE as a badge of allegiance by the community 
where it originated would be permitted, and that such use would potentially curb any 
commercial connotations which the trade mark owner establishes. However, draw-
ing upon the main characteristics of TCEs, I explain how the ‘use in the course of 
trade’ limitation does little to preserve TCEs considering the broad rights of trade 
mark owners which provide them with a monopoly on the use of the sign registered 
as a trade mark. Then, I turn to the even more thorny issue of how trade mark law’s 
‘anti-dilution’ provisions could have an additional knock-off effect on the unfettered 
circulation of TCEs.
TCEs, which document the history and culture of the communities living in a 
specific territory, have a variety of meanings and purposes. For example, TCEs are 
sometimes used to show affiliation to, or support of, their community. For the Sámi 
people, indigenous in northern parts of Norway, Sweden and Finland, their tradi-
tional clothing (called ‘gákti in Northern Sámi, mááccuh in Inari Sámi and määccaǩ 
in Skólt Sámi’ [59, p. 20]) represents more than just a way of covering one’s body. 
One of the main roles of Sámi traditional clothing is to denote ‘the person’s Sámi 
origin’ [59, p. 20]. Furthermore, the clothing is considered
‘a cultural object that contains expressive intellectual capital with which an 
individual is able to communicate with other members of the community and 
which at the same time expresses the individual in relation to their community 
and the community in relation to the outside world’ [59, p. 23].
 If a company or individual from outside the Sámi community were to register a 
trade mark consisting of a Sámi TCE, certain subsequent uses of that TCE by mem-
bers of the Sámi community could be prohibited, including the sale of traditional 
memorabilia in a museum shop.3 This is because trade mark owners can prohibit 
third parties from using a similar or identical sign, in the course of trade, in cases 
3 Sámi communities in various parts of Sweden, Finland and Norway promote their identity among other 
things via museums where they also offer for sale traditional objects and clothing. See in this respect the 
Vilhelmina museum at http://www.museu m.vilhe lmina .se/, the Sámi Museum in Inari, Finland at https 
://siida .fi/en/about -us/or the Varanger Samiske Museum in Norway at http://www.varjj at.org/web/index 
.php?giell a1=eng.
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where consumers are likely to be confused as to the origin of the products. It has 
been established that sale of goods which are to be used by the purchaser or end 
user as a badge of affiliation is a commercial activity included in the scope of the 
concept of ‘use in the course of trade’, and so such sale is considered to pave the 
way to infringement.4 In other words, even the ‘slightest’ commercial use of TCEs, 
which by their very nature convey an allegiance message in relation to the commu-
nity where they had originated, could be subject to a legal prohibition.
Defenders of the trade mark regime might argue that in the situation outlined 
above, members of the Sámi community could make use of one of the defences 
available under trade mark law, and thereby avoid infringement liability. The law 
does permit, for example, third parties to use non-distinctive signs or indications 
to describe the characteristics of goods without requiring the a trade mark owner’s 
permission if such use is in accordance with ‘honest practices in industrial and 
commercial matters’. Thus, members of the Sámi community could continue to 
use TCEs similar or identical to TCEs which have been registered as trade marks 
provided that their use is either purely non-commercial, or in accordance with said 
honest practices. As we have just seen, the concept of ‘use in the course of trade’ 
includes the use of a sign similar or identical to a registered trade mark as a badge of 
allegiance. Hence, it is defined in such a way to favour the rights of trade mark own-
ers. The same is also true for the notion of ‘use in accordance with honest practices 
in industrial and commercial matters’. According to the orthodox interpretation of 
‘honest practices’, such activities represent ‘the expression of a duty to act fairly in 
relation to the legitimate interests of the trade mark owner’.5 This presupposes how-
ever that the third party is, or must be aware, of the existence of the trade mark in 
question, of its owner and of the trade mark owner’s legitimate interests. This is an 
assumption which unjustifiably burdens a community which would have no reason 
to wonder whether one of the TCEs that they have been using for a long period of 
time has later become a registered trade mark.
Additionally, the use of a TCE for decorative purposes is also at risk of falling 
under the trade mark owner’s control, and thus faces the risk of being enjoined. 
Under the current approach, using TCEs to embellish goods may still count as a 
prohibited dilutive act when the public ‘establishes a link between the sign and the 
mark’.6 This link might not arise when the sign is used as a ‘pure embellishment’ 
or for an ‘entirely decorative’ purpose, but this is difficult to discern for two rea-
sons. First, ‘the boundaries of pure embellishment depend solely on the perception 
4 In Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew Reed [2002] I-10273 the CJEU considered that the use of a 
similar or identical sign by a third party as a badge of loyalty represents infringement even if that third 
party makes it clear that the products bearing the trade mark were not coming from the owner of the 
trade mark.
5 The interpretation of the meaning of ‘honest practices’ was laid down by CJEU in Bayerische 
Motorenwerke AG (BMW) and BMW Nederland BV v Ronald Karel Deenik [1999] I—925.
6 In Adidas-Salomon AG and Adidas Benelux BV v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd [2003] I-12537 the CJEU 
explained that when the public ‘establishes a link between the sign and the mark’ even if the sign is used 
as a decoration, the anti-dilution provisions are still applicable. Conversely, it is submitted that where the 
sign is used ‘purely as an embellishment’ it is not able to cause the establishment of a connection in the 
mind of the public and such entirely decorative use is permitted under the anti-dilution provisions.
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of consumers’ [40, p. 328]. Second, as most TCEs are affixed on traditional clothing 
or on household objects for decorative purposes [59, p. 24], there is no simple way 
to separate what counts as ‘pure embellishment’ from something that could be held 
to be trade mark infringement. For example, Romanian traditional attire involves the 
decoration of coats with patterns specific to each region of Romania. It is possible 
that these patterns, once registered as trade marks, later acquire a secondary ‘com-
mercial’ meaning. In this case, those Romanian consumers who are familiar with the 
pattern’s original connotation would also establish a link between the patterns used 
in a decorative way and the commercial origins of the products bearing the trade 
mark. It then becomes virtually impossible for consumers not to make a mental con-
nection between the trade mark and the TCEs used as embellishments. In this sense, 
from a linguistic perspective Professor Alan Durant explains that ‘there is no intui-
tive way of separating out a distinctive (secondary) meaning from a descriptive (pri-
mary) meaning for a given use of an ‘acquired secondary meaning’ trade mark’ [33, 
p. 130]. Furthermore, because TCEs are already embedded in the public mind as a 
symbol of tradition, the required link between TCEs registered as trade marks and 
TCEs used for decorative purposes could be easier to establish than in the case of 
other signs which had no particular meaning before being registered as trade marks.
The extensive interpretation of the concept of ‘use’ and the difficulty in applying 
the ‘honest practices’ defence, discussed above, presents an even greater challenge 
for TCEs when the trade mark owner is able to claim that their mark is ‘reputed’ 
because of the nature and extent of their commercial use of the trade mark. Reputed 
mark owners, under the European trade mark law, enjoy additional protection against 
dilution. Unlike the standard ‘traditional’ level of trade mark protection, dilution 
protection applies against uses on the same, similar or even dissimilar goods, and 
without needing to show that consumer confusion is likely. Instead, trade mark own-
ers must prove that any use (without due cause) of their reputed trade mark takes 
unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the reputation 
of the reputed mark. This type of legal protection seeks, among other things, to pre-
serve the image of the trade mark with reputation as the trade mark owner portrays 
it.
This development in trade mark law is explained by Lury, citing the work of 
Douglas and Isherwood. The latter posits that ‘consumption is to do with mean-
ing, value and communication as much as it is to do with exchange and economic 
relations’ [58, p. 14]. Thus, the meaning of a trade mark, although not completely 
departing from the traditional ‘origin’ function of a trade mark (seen to signify the 
source and quality of the goods) came to embody ‘a person’s gut feeling about a 
product, service or organization’ [63, p. 1]. Such feelings or ‘future experiences and 
attachments’ [6, p. 8] that consumers perceive in relation to a product, safeguarded 
via anti-dilution protection, are triggered by what can be regarded as ‘the brand’ [6, 
p. 8]. The point at which a brand name or logo coincides with an undertaking’s reg-
istered ‘mark’ (especially where the registered trade mark contains a word element 
or a figurative element) marks the intersection between trade marks and brands, trig-
gering the trade mark’s metamorphosis from a sign indicating origin into an invest-
ment in ‘hard equity’ [51, p. 7]. At this point, the mark adds a different type of value 
to the product: a value in the ‘form of immaterial capital’ [6, p. 8] which trade mark 
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owners are incentivised to protect. One immediate consequence is that ‘creating 
associations between products is becoming established as the exclusive prerogative 
of the trade mark owner’ [57] not only because the trade mark owner has the pos-
sibility to do so but also because she is encouraged to.
Hence, anti-dilution protection poses significant risks with respect to how TCEs 
can be used after a TCE has been registered as a mark, particularly if the trade mark 
owner decides to create a different ‘image’ from the one which the TCE enjoyed 
before registration. Put simply, the original meaning of a TCE will be typically dif-
ferent from that which a trade mark owner would wish, else the owner would have 
no interest in relying upon the anti-dilution provisions. In this context, another dan-
ger arises from the possibility of trade mark owners to either prohibit or inhibit uses 
which previously took place. As Durrant explains, even if a trade mark owner even-
tually loses a trade mark infringement claim:
‘the mere fact of litigation (even the threat of litigation) would have a chill-
ing effect by opening up a new frontier of protective action against allusive 
use, analogous to proprietors fending off potentially generic use of their trade 
mark’ [33, p. 137].
Lastly, the settled case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(‘CJEU’) allows for logical deductions to be made when assessing the risk of detri-
ment to the image of the reputed trade mark (e.g. detriment arising from the con-
trasting quality of the goods to which the marks in dispute are applied). This ‘logi-
cal deductions’ exercise establishes a low threshold for infringement, which may be 
carte blanche in the case of TCEs.
In this subsection, I have examined the way EU trade mark legislation grants 
trade mark owners exclusive rights which could create a monopoly over the mean-
ing of TCEs that have been registered as trade marks. The analysis explains how, 
within the EU, registered trade marks enjoy extensive protection which would per-
mit a trade mark owner from preventing the kind of uses which would preserve a 
TCE’s original meaning. The broad scope of legal protection reflects a wider para-
digm shift in the role and function of trade marks from merely ‘a device for con-
veying otherwise indiscernible information concerning a product’ [56, p. 371] to a 
‘valuable product in itself’ [56, p. 371].
The current general state of affairs has led to extensive scholarly challenge [30, 
p. 342, 71, p. 46], particularly in relation to ‘social and cultural concerns about the 
privatisation of words and phrases’ [71, p. 60]. But concerns in the case of TCEs—
which form part of the expressive discourse in a democratic society [70, p. 215] (as 
elucidated in the preceding sections of this article)—are at least as high as in the 
case of ‘words and phrases of the English language’ [71, p. 64]. Thus, when TCEs 
are used as registered trade marks, they become susceptible at the hands of private 
entities ‘in pursuit of their own commercial ends’ [43, p. 456] to removal from the 
pool of expressive resources which should be free for others to use. Such behaviour 
seems to serve no public interest because unlike copyright or patents, trade mark 
rights are not granted to reward creativity or innovation on the part of the rights 
holder [71, p. 64]. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the EU trade mark 
law’s current approach works in such a way that it may create harmful monopolies 
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over the signs registered as trade marks, which impinge upon the unfettered use of 
TCEs, especially in cases of alleged blurring, tarnishment and free riding.
In the following subsection, adopting a semiotic account of how trade marks 
function as signs in the ‘language of consumption’, I explain how once a TCE is 
registered as a trade mark, the proprietor’s monopoly as conferred by EU trade mark 
law contributes to their appropriation and misappropriation.
3.2  Appropriation and Misappropriation Through Trade Mark Registration: 
Overstated or Overlooked?
This subsection is concerned with the potential effects that trade mark registration 
of TCEs may have on their original meaning and dissemination, especially in terms 
of the commercial connotations that trade mark use elicits over the signs registered 
as trade marks. Here, I propose that trade mark use of TCEs contributes to cultural 
appropriation, which then paves the way to misappropriation. I begin the analysis 
with a brief account of the broad notion of cultural appropriation and the harmful 
and, allegedly, beneficial effects which may occur following the occurrence of cul-
tural appropriation.
Potential illustrations of what some regard as cultural exploitation are easy to 
find. In 2015, Kylie Jenner was censured for ‘appropriating black culture’ when she 
decided to change her hair style to braids [9]. In 2017, the fashion house Alexan-
der McQueen was accused of cultural appropriation too, by apparently ‘creating’ 
a jacket which resembled a traditional Ethiopian dress [17]. At the 2018 Resort 
fashion show, US designer Tory Burch’s collection included a white coat featuring 
‘African-influenced’ black motifs [67], later shown to be a close copy of a traditional 
Romanian  20th century coat exhibited at the New York Metropolitan Museum of 
Art. Following an intense social media campaign instigated by organizations foster-
ing traditional Romanian clothing, the design was removed from the designer’s web-
site, and Burch issued a statement acknowledging her original source of inspiration 
for the coat and correctly referencing the motif’s Romanian roots [7].
The fact that popular celebrities and brands are now promoted via social media 
means that they face constant global scrutiny. This has triggered a new trend against 
‘cultural appropriation’ in an effort to defend indigenous communities of former 
colonies’ from the ‘harms’ of the Western world. This online ‘battle’ against cul-
tural appropriation is no longer the preserve of traditional activists but has become a 
matter of concern for a wider public. Supporters of cultural appropriateness publicly 
disavow the conduct of those celebrities who are seen to endorse beauty techniques 
or couture inspired from minority native cultures. While as a matter of principle, 
such manifestations of civic spirit are commendable, the way in which ‘cultural 
appropriation’ is portrayed by the general public is likely both to blur its concep-
tual outline and generate exaggerated reactions. The above examples reflect a rather 
mundane and simplistic account of the term ‘cultural appropriation’, which Coombe 
describes as ‘the practice of white elites stealing the cultural forms of others for 
their own prestige and profit’ [24, p. 209]. This narrative inevitably endows this 
expression with negative connotations. However, the ‘stealing of cultural forms from 
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others’ [82, p. 6] does not necessarily generate negative or offensive results, as will 
be briefly explained below. According to Young, in the sphere of art, cultural appro-
priation may also involve object appropriation (the practice of moving artefacts from 
their initial location to a different culture’s location), content appropriation (stories 
or music are adapted by an artist pertaining to a different culture), style appropria-
tion or even motif appropriation [82, p. 6]. Whereas object and content appropria-
tion are accepted as morally difficult to justify because it is recognised that such acts 
are sometimes tantamount to stealing and may lead to harm including erosion of that 
community’s distinctness [82, p. 25], he notes that other types of appropriation are 
seen as generally justifiable because the actions may generate new valuable artefacts 
[82, p. 25]. Young’s explanation in this regard seems questionable because people 
assign different types of originality or artistic value to art objects.
Clifford claims that Picasso’s Girl before a Mirror is a work inspired by tribal 
artefacts of Kwakiutl natives [23, p. 193], as so is the result of what might be 
regarded as ‘cultural appropriation’ today. However, the final piece is undeniably 
valuable from an artistic perspective: ‘something new’ [23, p. 148] was born ‘in 
the presence of something exotic’ [23, p. 148]. Additionally, the ‘new thing’ does 
not appear to offend or hinder the distinctness of the native community to which 
the inspirational TCE belonged. It follows that cultural appropriation to create new 
artistic expressions, which copyright law will then generally protect, can be justified 
because society at large may benefit from access to these new works, which may in 
turn stimulate further creativity. We shall shortly return to discuss whether the same 
justification applies equally to trade mark registration of TCEs. But before doing 
so, I shall provide a semiotic account of how trade marks function as signs in the 
‘language of consumption’ [12, p. 43] since such account is most suited to explain 
how TCEs are susceptible of being deprived of their original meaning, and further 
misappropriated through the system of EU registered trade marks.
The main reason for choosing the semiotics narrative is that the structural theory 
of semiotics explaining how signs acquire meaning sharesf several common ele-
ments with the conditions for trade mark registration contained in the EU trade mark 
law and with the newly recognised advertising function of trade marks.
Specifically, trade marks are considered to fulfil an advertisement function which 
endows them with the power to deliver ‘products and services from producers to 
consumers in the most effective way possible’ [10, p. 131]. Most of the time, this 
practice involves the use of marketing research which allows companies to identify 
prospective users of their products and services [10, p. 132]. Marketing research is 
also referred to as ‘applied semiotic research’ [10, p. 133]. The former uses semi-
otic theories, which explain how signs acquire meaning, to ensure that trade marks 
used in advertising induce buyer associations [10, p. 153]. Just as a trade mark func-
tions as a vessel for indicating the origin of products, similarly from a semiotic per-
spective, a sign may take any shape as long as ‘someone interprets it as ‘signify-
ing’ something—referring to or standing for something other than itself’ [22, p. 13]. 
According to this view, the internal structure of a sign comprises of three elements 
[22, p. 13]: the ‘sign vehicle’ which is the form in which the sign is expressed, the 
‘interpretant’ which stands for the ‘the sense made of the sign’ and an ‘object’ which 
is an item external to the sign to which the sign pinpoints to [22, p. 29].
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These three elements may be found in the internal structure of the trade mark 
law [11, p. 624] as well. First, both the TMD 2015 and the EUTMR define trade 
marks as consisting of any signs capable of being represented on the register. Even 
if the condition that the sign needs to be capable of graphical representation has 
been recently waived in the EU trade mark law, the sign still must be able to be rep-
resented on the register in such a way that the subject matter of protection is clearly 
determinable. Therefore, the need for the sign to take a specific form is kept as con-
dition for trade mark registration purposes. Thus, the necessity of being a ‘sign vehi-
cle’ is a condition for trade mark registration too [11, p. 624]. The ‘sense made of 
the sign’ may be regarded [11, p. 624] as the requirement that the mark should be 
able to ‘distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other 
undertakings’. Finally yet importantly, the object of the sign is represented by the 
goods and services which the trade mark must distinguish [11, p. 624].
The meaning of the sign, from a semiotic perspective, is revealed by way of its 
interpretation rather than from its intrinsic content [22, p. 32]. If we were to apply 
this theory by analogy to trade marks, it would mean that the average consumer, the 
notional addressee of the trade mark, is revealing the meaning of the trade mark, 
taking into account the interplay between the three elements which compose the 
trade mark (i.e. its representation, the goods and services to which it refers and the 
ability of the trade mark to distinguish the origin of those goods or services to which 
it is applied).
Additionally, the semiotic narrative explains that the importance of a sign and 
its content resides in the interaction with other signs [22, p. 32]. Such explanation 
is compatible with the trade mark doctrine of ‘acquired distinctiveness’ or ‘second-
ary meaning’ [24, p. 64, 43, p. 231, 62, p. 738]. According to the secondary mean-
ing approach, descriptive signs which would normally not be entitled to trade mark 
protection (because they primarily function to convey information about what the 
goods are, rather than serving as an indicator of origin) may become distinctive over 
time, if buyer associations are created between the sign and the goods and services 
of the trade mark owner [62, p. 748]. TCEs already carry certain culturally signifi-
cant meanings and this might lead to the conclusion that they could be regarded as 
descriptive for certain goods and services. However, the TCE would still be eligible 
for registration, but first, the trade mark applicant needs to create ‘buyer associa-
tions’ [62, p. 748] between EoFs and the goods and services for which trade mark 
protection is sought. In other words, once the advertising message attached to TCEs 
is likely to supersede TCEs original cultural meaning [73, p. 371], the TCE may be 
appropriated via trade mark registration.
It follows that once a sign is taken from its original system of relations and is intro-
duced into a new one, the initial meaning and content of the sign changes as well. In the 
specific case of EoFs registered as trade marks, it is inevitable that their original mean-
ing will change because they have become badges for commercial exploitation, rather 
than signs of purely social or cultural importance. Furthermore, trade mark owners are 
also able to educate the public with respect to the meaning of ‘their’ trade marks [24, 
p. 167] as vessels of certain ‘brand values’ or associations. Having regard to a trade 
mark’s magnetism and its potential to become enmeshed in the public’s perception 
with the products in relation to which it has been used [72, p. 384], Senftleben likens 
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them to a ‘black hole that absorbs all the communication surrounding’ [72, p. 384]. 
Additionally, TCEs may be misappropriated when they are used in a ‘wrong way’ or in 
a stereotypical manner which may influence the image of certain groups [24, p. 188].
Despite existing compelling semiotic arguments explaining how trade mark regis-
trations may alter the meaning of TCEs, the EU does not, apparently, share any con-
cern that commercial exploitation may deprive TCEs of their original meaning. On the 
contrary, the European Commission has labelled the commercial exploitation of TCEs 
beneficial, even when such exploitation is undertaken ‘by persons outside the region 
where the folklore originates’ [37]. Surprisingly, the European Commission concludes 
that this stimulates ‘cultural exchange’ with the net ‘benefit’ that ‘authentic expressions 
of folklore […] become inherently better known and of higher economic value’ [37]. 
What it is telling is that this conclusion is not supported by any method to gauge or 
assess how and to what extent any EU indigenous community has benefited from oth-
er’s commercial exploitation of its TCEs. Moreover, use is ‘considered offensive when 
it economically benefits the appropriator without producing any economic, cultural or 
social benefit to the originating community’ [64, p. 19]. Even accepting the Commis-
sion’s contention that the TCEs have suffered no harm from commercial exploitation, 
appropriation may still be undesirable considering that inappropriate use of TCEs may 
create insulting or offensive associations, as discussed in the previous sections [82, p. 
26]. Unfortunately, the originating community cannot control any such negative con-
notations once the TCE has been registered as a trade mark.
As anticipated, while there is a case to be made for the good kind of appropriation 
in the arts or at least from a copyright law perspective because it may lead to ‘the pro-
duction of valuable works of art’ [82, p. 26] the same is not applicable to trade marks. 
This is because the cultural features of TCEs are transformed into commercial ones 
following trade mark registration and thus they become ‘a repository of value and 
meaning, which can be deployed across a wide range of products and services’ [61, p. 
1843]. Such transformation considers the business interests of the business owner, and 
in some cases the interests of consumers. Consequently, the cultural significance of the 
signs is completely disregarded since the role of trade marks is to sell and encourage 
consumption.
This subsection argued that appropriation occurs when a TCE obtains a secondary 
meaning following its association with a particular product or service [24, p. 197]. In 
certain situations, depending on the original meaning of the TCE in question and the 
precise way they are used, trade mark registration paves the way to misappropriation. 
In the following subsection I contend that while there is no express provision excluding 
TCEs per se from trade mark registration, there is scope to safeguard TCEs from appro-
priation and misappropriation under the current absolute grounds of refusal framework.
3.3  An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure
The adage—‘An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure’—was apparently 
coined by Benjamin Franklin when trying to convince Philadelphians to invest in 
fire prevention and thereby avoid the potentially devastating results of fire [77]. 
The philosophy behind this ‘proverb’ has so far proved accurate with respect to 
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the difficulty of ‘curing’ TCEs from the negative effects of trade mark registration. 
This is because, as I have shown above, the statutory limitations (i.e. post-factum 
defences or remedies) which EU trade mark law provides have not proved effective 
to curtail the scope of trade mark owner’s monopoly when it comes to unfettered cir-
culation of TCEs and their original meaning. In this subsection I investigate which 
mechanisms currently contained in EU trade mark law could be employed in order 
to prevent TCEs from being registered as trade marks in the first place, and hence 
ensure that they are not appropriated and misappropriated.
In trade mark law, ‘absolute grounds’ of refusal may be relied upon by examin-
ers in registration offices or interested third parties in order to oppose, or otherwise 
challenge, registration of a sign based upon general concerns or public interests [14, 
p. 928]. There are challenges when relying upon these grounds of refusal because 
the notion of ‘public interest’ is somewhat mercurial, yet it is accepted that each 
ground of refusal ‘must reflect different considerations’ of this public interest.7 What 
is important to note is that despite EU’s commitment to protect the ‘cultural her-
itage of European significance’, as discussed in the previous sections, none of the 
absolute grounds of refusal directly exclude EoFs from registration. Equally, ‘signs 
with cultural significance’ [73, p. 357] per se are not expressly excluded from trade 
mark registration either under EU law [73, p. 357]. Although it would seem desir-
able to have an express provision that specifically excludes such signs from registra-
tion, since this would avoid any ambiguities caused by hard-to-define concepts such 
as the ‘public interest’, EU trade mark law does include several absolute grounds 
which could be used to fill this gap. In the following paragraphs I explain why the 
exclusion of the TCEs from the registration may be justified as a matter of protecting 
the public interest.
First, current EU trade mark law excludes signs which are contrary to public pol-
icy or to accepted principles of morality from registration as trade marks. According 
to the Guidelines of the European Union Intellectual Property Office, the concept 
of ‘public policy’ at the level of EU reflects ‘a common understanding of certain 
basic principles and values’ which are contained in the body of ‘EU law applicable 
in a certain area’. The preservation of the European cultural heritage to which TCEs 
originating on the European continent belong is desirable as it triggers social and 
economic benefits. In this sense, the TFEU specifically provides the obligation of 
the EU to protect the ‘cultural heritage of European significance’. As we have seen, 
the registration of certain TCEs by an entity unconnected to the place of origin of 
the TCEs may undermine the TCEs’ original meaning and may even generate offen-
sive new meanings for the TCEs in question. Thus, an argument can be made in that 
such registration would contravene to EU’s public policy objectives of preserving 
the cultural heritage of European origin.
An approach which seems to aim at preserving the original meaning of cultur-
ally valuable artefacts was adopted by the advisory opinion of the EFTA Court with 
respect to the works of art of the famous Norwegian artist Gustav Vigeland. Here 
the issue was whether some of Vigeland’s works which lapsed copyright protection 
7 As per CJEU’s rationale in P SAT.1 SatellitenFernsehen GmbH v OHIM [2004] I-08317.
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could be registered as trade marks by the Municipality of Oslo. In this case the 
Court opined that ‘the risk of misappropriation or desecration of a work may be rel-
evant’ in deciding if such registration must be denied as per the absolute ground of 
refusal relating to the accepted principles of morality contained in the TMD 2008.
The territorial characteristic of TCEs which makes them cultural manifestations 
limited to certain regions or geographical areas of the Member States should not 
interfere with their belonging to the sphere of the European cultural heritage pro-
tected under the TFEU. This is because the notion of public policy, as per CJEU’s 
ruling in Couture Tech Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market [2011], 
must be assessed in accordance with ‘the particular circumstances of individual 
Member States which are likely to influence the perception of the relevant public 
within those States’ and not solely considering those elements common to all Mem-
ber States. That is to say, the public policy of one Member State is relevant when 
assessing the public policy of the EU as a whole. In the case of TCEs, adopting this 
line of reasoning would mean that those TCEs originating from one area of a Mem-
ber State but which are regarded as culturally significant by communities outside 
that Member State may be regarded as European TCEs. Hence, it may be argued 
that the provisions relating to public policy exclusion may be used in order to pre-
vent the trade mark registration of TCEs if such registration impedes, or is likely to 
impede, other rights provided by the legislation of the EU, including but not limited 
to the TFEU.
Trade mark law in New Zealand includes a refinement of the public policy and 
morality ground of refusal which aims directly at the protection of TCEs [41, p. 83]. 
This provision denies registration to signs that are offensive to a particular commu-
nity from a cultural point of view [41, p. 83]. The notion of ‘cultural offence’ has 
replaced the phrase ‘contrary to morality’ in New Zealand’s trade mark law [42], 
thus suggesting that the misappropriation of TCEs is not a completely different con-
cept than undermining ‘public morality’. Indeed, in New Zealand, the notion of ‘cul-
tural offence’ encompasses a situation in which registration is sought for a symbol 
which ignores or defies the purpose for which that symbol is commonly used [41, p. 
94]. Indeed, these provisions contained in New Zealand’s trade mark law represent a 
considerable step forward [46, p. 84, 84] and if introduced in the EU trade mark law, 
such ground of refusal would prove quite beneficial for European TCEs.
The closest approximation that EU trade mark legislation has to ‘cultural offence’ 
is an optional ground of refusal covering registration of signs of high symbolic 
value, in particular religious symbols. For example, in Italy where this provision has 
been implemented, the Italian trade mark office must notify interested public author-
ities which have jurisdiction in this field (i.e. dealing with signs of high symbolic 
value) when such signs are included in trade mark applications [60, p. 214].
Even in jurisdictions where this ground has been implemented, there would be 
difficulties when applying it to TCEs, because the reference to ‘high symbolic value’ 
may not stretch to ordinary symbols with cultural significance [73, p. 358], as the 
law does not provide any benchmark for where and how the line between a symbol 
with a high symbolic value and one with a medium or low symbolic value should 
be drawn. Also, there is no explanation as to how the value threshold is to be deter-
mined. Is it qualitative or quantitative? For the symbolic value to be ‘high’, does this 
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depend upon the number of people who regard a sign as valuable? Or on the effect 
and degree of reverence that the public, irrespective of its size, shows towards a cer-
tain sign?
A possible solution to the current law’s lack of clarity would be to adopt a legal 
instrument that identifies and records those TCEs belonging to Member States’ 
indigenous communities which are signs of high symbolic value. This seems like a 
viable option because the law does not impose special requirements in terms of what 
should qualify as a sign of ‘high symbolic value’. A sociological account explaining 
how ‘symbolic value is determined in relation to socio-cultural contexts’ [36, p. 1] 
could prove useful in supporting the claim that TCEs enjoy high symbolic value in 
the communities where they originate. For example, for the Sámi people, their tradi-
tional clothing is not merely a functional object that serves the purpose of keeping a 
person warm. According to a report of the Finish Ministry of Education and Culture 
investigating the needs of the Sámi people with respect to the protection of Sámi 
TCEs, ‘[T]he use of traditional Sámi clothing is linked to significant moral values, 
such as an expression of the individual’s identity and sense of belonging’ [59, p. 21]. 
If we accept Durkheim’s account of religion as ‘a unified system of beliefs and prac-
tices […] which unite into one single moral community called a Church […]’ [34, p. 
48] then we must accept that morally valuable TCEs, such as Sámi clothing, are not 
significantly different from religious signs which are presumed by trade mark law to 
possess high symbolic value. Hence, morally significant TCEs should qualify for the 
exclusion provided for signs of high symbolic value.
Apart from their culturally relevant meaning, TCEs are important as ‘cultural 
capital’ [35, p. 32]. This may act as an incentive for some unrelated third parties to 
register TCEs with the sole purpose of later licensing the use of the sign. For exam-
ple, the Norwegian bunad is a traditional folk costume consisting of hand embroi-
dered details which may cost up to EUR 4000 [35, p. 27]. Eriksen explains that from 
an anthropological perspective, the ‘economics of the bunad is deeply informed by 
cultural values and norms relating to tradition’ [35, p. 27]. Hence, it is the public’s 
cultural attachment to it what makes the bunad so much more expensive than other 
articles of clothing. From this perspective, TCEs may be seen as signs with ‘added 
value’ which can give rise to what Senftleben refers to as ‘cultural heritage grab-
bing’ [73, p. 358]. This practice of unrelated third party free-riding on symbols hav-
ing cultural importance typically involves trade mark registration of the TCEs in 
order ‘to impose an obligation on other traders to obtain licenses for its use’ [73, p. 
358]. While the public interest exclusion might not be fully applicable in this situa-
tion—for example if the trade mark applicant has no plan to alter the meaning of the 
TCE—this kind of conduct might arguably fall with the exclusion to registration of 
signs in bad faith.
In order to rely successfully on the bad faith exclusion, it is necessary to show 
that the trade mark applicant knew that the sign applied for was identical or simi-
lar to one which an indigenous community had been using for the same or similar 
goods, and that the applicant sought registration with the intention of prohibiting 
others including the community where the TCE originated from using that sign 
(as per the CJEU’s guidance in Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli AG v Franz 
Hauswirth GmbH [2009] I-04893). In the case of TCEs, the requirement for prior 
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use by the community where it originated is fulfilled, since TCEs have a tempo-
ral standing, and sometimes may even be qualified as ‘a resource of the past’. As 
for the applicant’s knowledge of the sign’s cultural and folkloric connotations, 
this will often to be straightforward to establish since the chances of not knowing 
about the prior use of specific a TCE are rather remote, especially considering the 
speed of digital information dissemination, and readily available sources of pub-
lic information. In relation to the intention to use the registration to prohibit third 
parties from using the protected mark in the future, then the intention to exclude 
others may be considered as tacitly manifested when a petitioner applies for the 
registration of a trade mark. After all, one of the main reasons why applicants 
seek to register trade marks is to secure the legal right to exclude others from 
using a similar or identical sign. In spite of bad faith often being considered only 
a ‘general catch-all provision’ [68, p. 392], I take the view that this provision may 
prove genuinely helpful for TCEs.
As has been analysed above, interested parties may successfully challenge, and 
registration office examiners may successfully refuse, registration of TCEs based 
on two grounds already contained in EU trade mark legislation. EU trade mark 
law governing national trade mark law seems to be more favourable for TCEs 
than that governing pan-EU rights because it allows Member States to enact a 
provision which more directly relates to TCEs, but this is also contingent upon 
those Member States recognising TCEs as signs having ‘high symbolic value’. 
The prohibition on registration of signs made in bad faith has a wider scope of 
application, as a mandatory provision in both the TMD 2015 and EUTMR which 
therefore applies to all national and pan-EU trade mark rights.
4  Trade Marks Consisting of TCEs
So far, this article has, inter alia, established the definitions and characteristics 
of TCEs, outlined the EU’s commitment to safeguarding TCEs and identified the 
potentially negative consequences which might entail from registering TCEs as 
trade marks. This section analyses two cases where TCEs have been registered 
as trade marks. These studies assume that these TCEs (as most are) are known 
by at least part of the public where the TCEs in question originate. Hence, the 
TCEs may be considered as possessing ‘niche fame’ which is the threshold which 
would make them eligible for anti-dilution protection under EU trade mark law, 
to prevent a reputed mark from suffering harm from blurring, tarnishment or free-
riding [20, p. 92]. With this assumption in place, this section aims to show that, 
just like reputed trade marks, TCEs suffer from this type of harm too. However, 
while the trade mark infringement test requires a change (or at least a risk of 
change) in consumers’ behaviour, we shall not consider this aspect because unlike 
registered trade marks, TCEs are not intended to determine consumers’ purchas-
ing choices. Therefore, this criterion is incompatible with the purposes of TCEs 
which, as previously shown, relate to self-identification, self-expression etc.
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4.1  The Starbucks Siren: A Case of Cultural Tarnishment?
The EU Intellection Property Office (‘EUIPO’) promotes the idea that ‘Your trade 
mark tells customers who you are’. This subsection questions whether this conten-
tion is valid in the case of the siren logo which Starbucks has registered as an EU 
trade mark at the EUIPO.
The supernatural creatures that are sirens, or ‘mermaids’ as they are sometimes 
known, are portrayed in different forms and feature in many traditional stories 
around the globe. The oldest and most famous account of sirens may, perhaps, be 
found in ancient Greek writings. Homer’s Odyssey (approximately 700 BCE) [66, p. 
1] describes them as creatures that lured sailors to their death through their beguil-
ing song. Despite a lack of precision in the Odyssey itself [74, p. 12], artists have 
typically depicted these sirens as women with a bird’s tails [74, p. 12], as illustrated 
on the famous Siren Vase currently held in the collection of the British Museum. 
Subsequent Greek authors (including Ovid in the Metamorphoses) [74, p. 12] also 
embraced sirens into their works. Apparently possessing qualities which ‘made the 
wisdom of the sage unnecessary’ [74, p. 12], sirens were seen by Greek society at 
that time as a catalyst in humans’ relationship with knowledge [74, p. 12]. Today, 
the definition of cultural heritage in the Greek legislation is very broad. It includes 
‘expressions, activities, knowledge and information, such as fables, customs, oral 
traditions’ [50]. Based upon this definition, sirens could qualify as a Greek originat-
ing TCE.
Starbucks adopted the siren as the company logo in 1971. The graphical repre-
sentation consists of a creature having a woman’s upper body and a double fish tail. 
The Starbucks’ website describes the figure as ‘mysterious and alluring’ [75]. Star-
bucks is the proprietor of various trade mark registrations for its siren logo including 
EUTM no 008517054 and EUTM no 000689786, both registered for a wide range 
of products including, but not limited to, ground and whole bean coffee, cocoa, tea, 
restaurants, cafes, cafeterias, musical sound recordings, electric espresso makers, 
electric wallets, billfold etc. EUTM no 008517054 covers the original version of 
the siren logo whereas EUTM no 000689786 covers the current version of the mark 
which updated the earlier form by adding a crown and covering the siren’s breasts 
with her hair.
Before Starbucks’ logo could achieve its ‘indication of origin’ function (essen-
tial for it to function as a trade mark), at least some of the original meanings of the 
siren figure would first have to have been changed. Additionally, Starbucks would 
have needed to create new consumer associations between the siren and its products 
which would weakened, if not completely extinguish, the relationship between the 
siren and its Greek mythology origin. Reframing this in terms of the trade mark 
concept of tarnishment, had the ‘reputation’ of the siren—as TCE—benefited from 
the same protection as a reputed trade mark does against denigration, then arguably, 
its association with such mundane activities as coffee retail etc. would be regarded 
as impermissible ‘tarnishment’ because of the negative impact on the image of a 
symbol portrayed by the Greek vision of enlightenment and transmission of knowl-
edge. Additionally, the way the company sought to ‘censor’ the siren’s breasts in the 
later version of the Starbucks’ logo might also be regarded as offending the TCE, 
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considering that nudity is a central element of ancient Greek art. While Starbucks’ 
website features ‘The Story Behind the Siren on Starbucks Anniversary Blend Cof-
fee Packaging’ [75] in which the company’s senior designer sets out his view of 
the message which the siren’s appearance conveys, neither he nor the Starbucks’ 
corporate website feature any information explaining their Greek origins and his-
tory. Unfortunately, the fate of the siren is not unique, as Greek symbols and names 
have been successfully exploited and deprived of their original meaning before. As 
Senftleben rightly points out [73, p. 356], the general public are most unlikely to 
associate NIKE with the Greek goddess of victory, since the sportswear brand has 
achieved its purpose of creating origin significance for the purposes of trade mark 
protection.
4.2  The Internet Meets the Dacian Woolf: A Case of Cultural Free‑Riding?
The case of the siren is not singular as it shares a common fate with Draco, a figure 
encountered in the myths and legends of the Dacian culture. The Dacians were an 
ancient civilisation that inhabited part of the territory known now as Romania from 
around 1800 BC [45, p. ix]. Along with the Getae, the Dacians are partially con-
sidered the ancestors of the Romanian people. Their rich cultural heritage ranging 
from myths about the afterlife [45, p. 103] to jewellery, art, and other objects is still 
cherished today. The Romans, under the command of Emperor Trajan, conquered 
the Dacians in 107 AD following two military campaigns [45, p. 73]. After the vic-
tory, Trajan commissioned Trajan’s Column in Rome to represent ‘a narrative of 
the Dacian campaigns’ [29] depicting the numerous battles which took place and 
the ultimate victory for the Romans. Trajan’s Column depicts the flag used by the 
Dacians when they were waging war. The flag embodies Draco: a mythical creature 
having the head of a wolf and the body of a snake [65, p. 127], also known as the 
Dacian Wolf. According to Romanian legend, Draco was a figure popular among 
military troops and those who used to worship the knight-gods [65, p. 127]. The 
significance of the Dacian Wolf is closely linked to the idea of courage, dignity and 
freedom [44]. The Dacian New Year is a pagan ceremony dedicated, inter alia, to the 
celebration of the wolf which takes place annually on November  30th [44].
Bitdefender is a relatively well-known company founded in Romania which pro-
vides security and antivirus software all over the world. The company’s trade mark 
portfolio includes several national and international figurative trade marks consist-
ing of stylized versions of Draco including Cypriot trade mark no 82972 and inter-
national trade mark no 1090871. Unlike Starbucks, Bitdefender’s official website 
does provide an overview of Draco’s origins and meanings and it contains references 
to Trajan’s Column and other artefacts which contain depictions of Draco [16]. The 
company also mentions that it carries on ‘the standard of our Dacian ancestors as 
a symbol of courage, determination and victory in our fight against online threats’ 
[16].
Although the company’s action in giving credit about the history of Draco seems 
commendable as the fair thing to do, its trade mark registrations may still be con-
sidered to be a form of exploitation because they ride on the coat-tails of Draco’s 
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reputation. In this case, free-riding occurs because of a transfer of the positive image 
of Draco as portrayed in local legends and myths to Bitdefender’s own products and 
services. In a similar vein, it could also be argued that Bitdefender’s adoption of the 
image of Draco as a trade mark permits the company to ‘benefit from its power of 
attraction, its reputation and its prestige’ just as free-riding is depicted in L’Oreal 
S.A. v Bellure N.V. and others [2009] I-05185. Equally important in establishing a 
case of impermissible free-riding under trade mark law is that the unauthorised user 
has not paid any financial compensation to the trade mark owner, nor invested in its 
own marketing efforts. In the case at hand, Bitdefender did not contribute in any way 
to the creation of Draco’s image ‘as a symbol of courage, determination and vic-
tory’ [16]. On the other hand, one may not disregard the fact that Bitdefender was, 
no doubt, required to invest certain resources into making its trade marks distinctive 
such that consumers associate the Draco trade marks with its products. Nevertheless, 
this expenditure does not exclude the fact the Draco legend provided cultural capital 
which contributed to Bitdefender’s logo popularity and overall brand success.
5  Conclusion
TCEs must be considered based upon an internal perspective given the societal, 
temporal and territorial elements which contribute to these symbols’ formation as 
culturally significant. However, the notion of culture is itself constantly evolving, 
based upon the ‘dynamic, subjective and relative’ [18, p. 115] nature of its compo-
nent values. Recently, the notion of culture has, perhaps, lost its conceptual outline 
as there has been reconsideration of which elements, including aspects such as race, 
gender or ethnicity, should be regarded as essential for its creation [2, p. 190]. This 
may explain why the various legal definitions of TCEs fail to fully capture the com-
plexity of these social phenomena. Nevertheless, inability to craft the ‘perfect’ legal 
definition should not be used as a pretext to permit the appropriation and misappro-
priation of TCEs by the registered trade mark regime.
Some commentators suggest that appropriation and misappropriation could be 
avoided if a separate IP-based regime was established to protect TCEs directly, how-
ever this proposition has continued to face serious challenges [4, p. 396, 49, p. 894]. 
A main criticism to this proposal is that legitimising property rights in respect of 
subject matter having such blurred boundaries and recognition standards [2, p. 223] 
would create complications which would outweigh any benefit. Additionally, an IPR 
regime presupposes that a rightful owner of the TCE in question exists. Even if the 
rightful loner presents itself, there is no guarantee that Western proprietary legal 
regimes would be able to understand how such ownership is conceived. As Brown 
points out [19, p. 191], in cases where the mystical beliefs of indigenous peoples 
had to be demonstrated, the observers were not able to comprehend other people’s 
thinking or feelings [19, p. 191]. Nevertheless, if we accept that ‘it is hard to make 
the case for ownership by a culture of motifs, patterns, or general plot types’ [83, p. 
222] than, a fortiori, EU trade mark law should not allow private entities to (effec-
tively) ‘own’ certain TCE by use of trade mark registration. Thus, even if ‘common 
IP rationales aiming to protect intangible goods fail when it comes to the protection 
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of folklore’ [49, p. 884], this should not mean that trade mark law should create a 
safe harbour for the appropriation and misappropriation of TCEs.
A less intrusive option might be to oblige trade mark owners to disclose the ori-
gin of the TCE which they use as a trade mark. Yet, this option may prove ineffec-
tive in cases where the origins of TCEs are disputed or insufficiently evidenced. In 
such complex cases, information about the possible origins of the sign could be pre-
sented in a manner that assists consumers to understand the uncertainty of the origi-
nal meaning of the symbol in question. Such an approach, although not solving the 
problem of establishing the real origin of the symbol, is certainly preferable to the 
current situation where the trade mark owner may only present the public with infor-
mation which educates them the commercial connotation of the TCE, when used as 
a trade mark.
EU trade mark law appears to bolster the appropriation of TCEs and in certain 
situations to the point of misappropriation. Here, misappropriation occurs when the 
TCE, which has been registered as a trade mark, acquires a secondary ‘trade mark’ 
meaning in line with the ‘distinctiveness’ requirements of EU trade mark law. Mis-
appropriation may also occur when the trade mark TCE conveys a message to con-
sumers which either denigrates the community which originated the TCE or one 
which is stereotypical. As the examples presented in this article demonstrated, mis-
appropriation may even occur even beyond what some authors regard as histories of 
‘colonisation, domination, and subjugation’ [2, p. 192]. Once a TCE has been appro-
priated or misappropriated, then trade mark registration may, among other negative 
effects, become an obstacle which prevents consumers from appreciating the val-
ues of the community from which the TCE originated [69, p. 398]. This article has 
advanced the thesis that express provisions which preserve the right to freedom of 
expression and the right to culture should provide the backdrop against which the 
limitations of a trade mark owner’s rights and the absolute grounds of refusal con-
tained in the EU legislation should be construed. Both EU legislation and conven-
tions signed under the auspices of the Council of Europe contain provisions which 
seek to preserve European cultural heritage of which TCEs form part. Even though 
the CJEU alone has jurisdiction to interpret EU law, ECtHR jurisprudence has been 
visibly influential in CJEU decisions involving fundamental rights [21]. Not only 
has ‘the ECJ has mentioned the ECHR in 57 judgments’ [38, p. 13], but that CJEU 
jurisprudence has also cited ECtHR decisions [38, p. 98]. Therefore, the ECHR and 
ECtHR jurisprudence are not only relevant in the context of protecting TCEs from 
appropriation and misappropriation, but should be considered when considering EU 
trade mark law.
This article proposes that adoption of express provisions which deny registered 
trade mark protection to TCEs may go some way to circumvent the need to establish 
ownership over certain TCEs while also preventing appropriation and misappropria-
tion. This solution would be facilitated at the EU-level by the creation of databases 
including, if not all TCEs, at least the most well-know and unchallenged ones. The 
criteria for inclusion in such a TCE database might require that the TCE is recog-
nized as culturally significant by a community located on the territory of the EU. 
The idea of preventing misappropriation and appropriation of TCEs by their removal 
from the pool of signs available for trade mark registration should be understood 
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as an attempt to encourage free and unfettered dissemination of TCEs. Similarly, 
refusal to register a TCE as a trade mark to promote a single entity’s commercial 
goals may be recognised as a way of preserving both the dignity of the communities 
to which they belong [19, p. 6] and the inherent values which TCEs embody. Trade 
mark law should not assist business to free-ride on the coat-tails of traditional cul-
tural expressions.
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